US Government Restricts Remote Access to Advanced AI Chips and Formally Rescinds the AI Diffusion Rule

US Government Restricts Remote Access to Advanced AI Chips and Formally Rescinds the AI Diffusion Rule

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Introduction

On November 15, 2026, the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) on “remote access” to advanced semiconductors, the high-performance processors used to train and run AI models. BIS’s announcement notably describes the IFR as “written by and at the direction of the Department of Treasury and the National Security Council,” underscoring the US government’s interagency split on whether to issue the rule. 

The IFR does not define “remote access,” but the term generally refers to using the computing power of chips housed in another company’s data center, typically by renting capacity from those centers, without providing the underlying commodities, software or technology to the customer. US export control rules already restrict the export of certain advanced chips to companies headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in, China, other Country Group D:5 countries, or Macau. Indirect access to the same computing power by the same companies through data centers located in third countries had been less settled.

The new IFR addresses this unsettled remote access issue by restricting how companies may use advanced chips subject to the US export regulations, and the servers containing them, after export. It imposes obligations on companies that supply the hardware (that is, the advanced chips and servers) and on companies that possess it after export, such as data center operators, including companies outside the United States.

The IFR will take effect on the date BIS publishes it in the Federal Register, which has not occurred as of the date of this alert, and BIS will accept comments for 60 days after publication. Shipments already en route on the publication date may proceed under the prior rules if those shipments are completed within 30 days. This alert summarizes the IFR’s main provisions, identifies steps companies should consider now, and explains how the IFR relates to the AI Diffusion Rule and other existing rules and guidance.

How the IFR Extends Export Controls to Remote Access

The IFR appears to assert an expansion of BIS’s authority under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) insofar as it positions BIS as regulating not only the export of certain AI chips themselves but also the service by non-US persons of providing remote access to their computational capacity. This rule also reflects a significant policy shift: BIS previously had advised that “[t]he service of providing computational capacity would not be subject to the EAR as the service provider is not shipping or transmitting any commodity, software, or technology to the user.” To the extent the IFR purports to impose a license requirement on providing certain computational capacity as such, it creates, in the context of remote access to chips for AI-related purposes, a significant exception to this widely cited guidance applicable to cloud computing generally. 

Indeed, on the apparent premise that statutory change was needed for BIS to exercise such authority, BIS had advocated for the passage of the proposed Remote Access Security Act, which the outgoing Congress has described as an expansion of statutory authority under ECRA “to restrict foreign adversaries’ ability to access technologies, including AI chips, remotely through cloud computing services.” While the bill has received some bipartisan support, it has not become law, making BIS’s assertion of authority without statutory change a notable feature of the IFR, and highlighting a lack of clarity regarding whether BIS has the statutory authority to impose all aspects of this rule.

The New Data Center Controls

Under the IFR, exporters must obtain from BIS a license to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) advanced chips, listed equipment that contains them (such as computers and servers), and related software and technology to any foreign country when the exporter has knowledge that the hardware is destined for a data center that provides, or will provide, computing power above a set threshold to companies headquartered in Macau or a Country Group D:5 country. 

Key features of the new licensing requirement include the following:

  • Performance. The threshold is “more than 12,000,000 ‘aggregate TPP.’” TPP, or total processing performance, is BIS’s existing measure of a chip’s computing power; and aggregate TPP is the sum of all of the advanced chips and listed equipment in a group. In calculating TPP, BIS counts the access that companies within the IFR’s scope receive at a single data center or across “linked data centers,” meaning separate data centers that share resources and workloads “as a unified whole.” The threshold is notably low, and more companies will likely trigger it than would have triggered the threshold under the prior AI Diffusion Rule, which allowed companies to export more than twice that amount without a license as a low-volume order. 
  • Liability. The requirement applies to anyone in possession of, or responsible for, the hardware, including a data center operator that had no part in importing it, and the IFR contains no exception for data centers that US-headquartered companies operate. BIS states in the IFR that a change “from a non-prohibited end-use to a prohibited end-use” is “considered a ‘transfer (in-country)’” that requires authorization. 
  • Knowledge / Know-Your-Customer. With the IFR, BIS has expanded exporters’ “know your customer” obligation and, moreover, articulated that if a foreign data center declines or is “unable to provide” sufficient information to verify compliance with the end-use controls, then exporters have presumptive knowledge of a violation of those controls. The coverage of “linked data centers” noted above also requires enhanced due diligence of more attenuated customers—as the rule’s requirements apply where there is “knowledge” that a data center is providing remote access to a permissible customer that may be then training or providing AI models to an entity in a D:5 country. 
  • Licensing Data Centers. The IFR states that any data center that already provides “significant” computing power to companies headquartered in Macau or Country Group D:5 countries and that “wishes to continue” must obtain a license within 90 days of the IFR’s effective date to do so. The IFR does not specifically identify the operative EAR prohibition against which these licenses would provide authorization. Nor does the IFR specifically define “significant” for this purpose although BIS appears to contemplate that the performance threshold is “significant.” 
  • Existing Requirements and Self-Disclosure. BIS notes that an existing licensing requirement (15 C.F.R. § 744.23) already applies when an exporter exports advanced chips on behalf of a company within the regulation’s scope—for example, when the in-scope company is the purchaser or is the “exclusive or primary (greater than 50 percent of total compute) remote end user” of a data center’s computing capacity. BIS adds that companies in violation of that requirement “should submit a voluntary self-disclosure.” 
  • Is Informed Letters. The IFR adds a new “is informed” provision, under which BIS may notify companies individually or by amending the EAR that those companies need a license to export “specified” items to certain persons or destinations. 
  • Exception. The IFR creates one notable exception: the license requirement does not apply when the data center provides computing power only for a “commercial recommender system” and the exporter reports the arrangement to BIS. The IFR defines that term as a tool “exclusively designed and exclusively used to rank, filter, or suggest commercial products, services, or content to users,” such as the recommendation tools that online retailers and social media companies use. The definition excludes any system designed or used to generate new content rather than to rank, filter, or otherwise organize existing content.

New License Requirement for Five Countries

The IFR also amends section 742.6 of the EAR to require a license to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) specific advanced computing chips, and the servers that contain them, to or within Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil, which BIS says present a heightened risk of diversion to prohibited users. This requirement applies to the items themselves, based on their destination and regardless of their use. 

The requirement does not apply when the recipient is headquartered in the United States or has an ultimate parent headquartered in the United States, so long as the supplier complies with a new reporting requirement that requires monthly reports to BIS with detailed product information. BIS noted that it may make additional countries subject to this license requirement.

How the IFR Differs from the AI Diffusion Rule and Affects Other Existing Rules

The IFR is the latest in a sequence of disparate efforts to bring AI under the export control regime, The Biden Administration published the AI Diffusion Rule on January 15, 2025, to manage how computing power spread across the world. The Diffusion Rule would have extended export licensing requirements for advanced chips to every country, with exceptions for close US allies, while effectively prohibiting such exports to China and other jurisdictions subject to US arms embargoes, and would have capped the aggregate computing power of chips that all other countries could receive. It also would have restricted exports of the most powerful models by controlling their “model weights”—the numerical values a model learns in training and that are largely responsible for determining the model’s outputs. On May 13, 2025, two days before the AI Diffusion Rule’s compliance date, the Trump Administration announced that BIS would not enforce the Diffusion Rule and instead planned to rescind it. The rule nonetheless remained a part of the EAR. Our previous alerts describe the Diffusion Rule and its suspension.

The newly issued IFR now completes the Diffusion Rule’s rescission, removes provisions addressing country caps, and removes controls based on model weights. Its country-based license requirements cover a defined list of destinations instead of every country, and its main new license requirement depends on who uses the computing power, wherever in the world the chips are located.

The IFR adjusts, but does not reverse, the advanced chip rules that BIS issued after the Diffusion Rule. It carries forward BIS’s January 2026 policy of reviewing case-by-case, instead of presumptively denying, license applications for certain less advanced chips destined for China or Macau, and it retains the favorable treatment for approved recipients of these chips in the United Arab Emirates that BIS announced in a July 2026 final rule. It tightens a January 2025 rule (which one of our earlier alerts described) on chips that contract manufacturers (foundries) and packaging firms produce with advanced processes. When the chip’s designer is located in, or has an ultimate parent headquartered in, a country for which advanced chips require a license, including the five newly listed countries, the manufacturer must now treat the chip as an advanced chip unless a designer that BIS has approved, or that otherwise qualifies as authorized, attests that it is not an advanced chip.

The IFR also builds on BIS’s recent guidance. It does not mention or withdraw the May 2025 guidance on diversion red flags and on data centers that train models for parties in countries of concern, which appears to remain in effect. The IFR does cite BIS’s guidance from May 2026, which confirmed that companies need a license to export advanced chips for companies within the IFR’s scope wherever those companies are located. It moves that requirement to section 744.23 of the EAR. That guidance instructed bona fide data center operators that they need not stop using hardware already in place “until further notice from BIS.” BIS appears to provide such notice through the IFR’s 90-day license deadline for data centers presently providing “significant volume of compute power” to companies within the IFR’s scope.

What Companies Should Consider Now

Suppliers of advanced chips and servers, including resellers, should consider how they will obtain and document information about a data center’s “know-your-customer” due diligence practices before engaging in covered exports. And, BIS expects diligence to be dynamic and not static. BIS notes that it plans to be “actively monitoring” potential evasion and has threatened measures such as import restrictions, designations and other license requirements to ensure compliance with the rule. 

  • Data center and cloud operators outside the United States, including those of US-headquartered companies, should consider measuring the computing power that companies within the IFR’s scope receive across linked data centers and reviewing who owns and controls their customers. An operator that intends to keep serving such companies will need to determine, likely with the assistance of counsel, whether a US authorization is required within 90 days of the IFR’s effective date in order to lawfully continue the business.
  • Customers of non-US data centers are likely to face new diligence questions and contract terms from their providers, particularly if they train or supply AI models for others.
  • Companies exporting to the five listed countries should plan for license applications, and US-headquartered recipients should confirm that their suppliers will file the monthly reports on which the exception depends.
  • Suppliers and operators should review current as well as new arrangements to ensure adequate compliance and determine whether any self-disclosure to BIS is warranted.
  • Several points remain unclear, including (1) whether BIS will measure the threshold per customer or in total, (2) what counts as “significant” computing power for the 90-day requirement, and (3) whether data centers serving only recommender systems must still obtain a license after 90 days, as BIS’s explanation suggests. Affected companies should consider raising these points and clarifying any other ambiguities during the comment period.

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WilmerHale’s National Security and International Trade practices are monitoring the IFR’s publication and implementation. Our team has extensive experience in export control and trade compliance, including counseling leading companies in the semiconductor and AI ecosystem regarding how export controls should be understood to apply to the full AI stack. WilmerHale’s team is available to help clients assess the consequences of this IFR and to navigate its requirements going forward while providing strategic guidance on where Congress and the executive branch are likely to go in shaping the parameters of US law and policy on AI infrastructure and services abroad.

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