Following the fall of Syria’s Assad regime, the United States and key allies have recently announced sanctions relief with the stated goal of stabilizing Syria under its newly installed leaders. This client alert recaps the multidimensional sanctions framework that has been in place for Syria and describes the partial sanctions relief recently offered by the United States, European Union and United Kingdom. While significant Syria-related sanctions have been lifted, many important restrictions remain in place, mandating continued caution for those undertaking business with Syria or Syrian entities.

Below is a summary of recent developments in the United States and European Union on May 23 and May 27, 2025, respectively: 

• The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License (GL) 25, which suspends certain US sanctions against Syria. US persons are now authorized to provide services to people and companies in Syria, conduct new investments, import petroleum and petroleum products, transact with the new Syrian government, and transact with certain blocked persons listed on the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list. GL 25 does not, however, authorize the unblocking of any property or interests in property that were blocked as of May 22, 2025. 
• The Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) similarly eased restrictions and provided exceptive relief under 31 U.S.C. 5318(a)(7) and 31 C.F.R. 1010.970 to the Commercial Bank of Syria. 
• The State Department also waived for 180 days the application of sanctions under Section 7412 of the Caesar Syria Civil Protection Act (Caesar Act) regarding foreign persons who engage in transactions with Syria.
• However, while Treasury and the State Department have eased restrictions, significant US export controls administered by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) against Syria remain in place. 
• The Council of the European Union formally adopted legal acts lifting all economic sanctions on Syria, with exceptions for measures related to security concerns, such as arms embargoes and restrictions on items used for internal repression (Regulation (EU) 2025/1094, Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1096, Regulation (EU) 2025/1098). As part of this decision, the European Union removed 24 entities from its sanctions list, including entities such as the Central Bank of Syria and companies operating in key sectors such as oil production, refining, cotton and telecommunications. However, the European Union maintains sanctions against individuals and entities linked to the Assad regime, extending these listings until June 1, 2026, and reaffirming its commitment to accountability and support for a peaceful transition (Art. 1(7) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1096).

Historical Context: US Sanctions and Export Controls on Syria

Syria has been traditionally a comprehensively sanctioned jurisdiction under US law. The country has been designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism since December 1979. In December 2003, the President signed into law the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SAA), in which Congress directed the President to implement a host of trade restrictions on Syria. The SAA contains specific requirements that must be met for restrictions to be lifted and provides the President with limited sanctions waiver authorities. In May 2004, the Bush Administration issued Executive Order 13338, which targeted entities and officials in or closely associated with the Syrian government that have engaged in actions of concern as specified in the SAA.

Following the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, the Obama Administration began to issue a series of targeted Executive Orders pursuant to the President’s authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to expand the sanctions regime to block the property of Syrian government officials and affiliated entities; prohibit new American investment in Syria, the export or sale of American services to Syria, and the import of Syrian petroleum or petroleum products; and impose secondary sanctions on foreign persons engaging in sanctions evasion activities.¹  In 2019, Congress passed the Caesar Act through the National Defense Authorization Act, which targeted members of the Assad regime and imposed mandatory sanctions against foreign persons who enabled the regime and profited off the Syrian Civil War.²  Although the Caesar Act includes specific requirements that must be met for the United States to lift its Syria sanctions, the statute also grants the President authority to exercise time-limited waiver authorities.

Virtually all require a license from BIS to be exported or reexported to Syria, except for EAR99 food and medicine. A license is required for the deemed export and deemed reexport of any technology or source code on the Commerce Control List (CCL) to a Syrian national, and only limited license exceptions are available. Most exports and reexports of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) fall under a general policy of denial for licensing by BIS. Certain items, such as medicines on the CCL, medical devices, and parts and components intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft, may be considered for licensing by BIS on a case-by-case basis. Informational materials in the form of books and other media, publicly available software and technology, and technology exported for certain intellectual property purposes can be exported or reexported to Syria without a license. 

Developments: Multiagency US Sanctions Relief

In December 2024, the Assad regime collapsed. After taking office in January 2025, the Trump Administration began to alter the long-standing US sanctions regime against Syria, moving to lift sanctions to give the country what President Trump described as “a chance at peace.” Commenting on the policy shift, Trump said of Syria: “There is a new government that will hopefully succeed … I say, good luck, Syria. Show us something special.”

Syria’s new leadership, for its part, called the United States’ decision to ease Assad-era sanctions a “positive step.”

OFAC General License 25

Shortly following the collapse of the Assad regime, on January 6, 2025, OFAC issued GL 24, “Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances,” which authorized certain limited transactions with the new Syrian government and transactions in the Syrian energy sector. On May 23, 2025, OFAC issued GL 25, “Authorizing Transactions Prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations or Involving Certain Blocked Persons.” GL 25 suspends OFAC-administered sanctions against Syria. In its press release, Treasury said that the United States has provided sanctions relief to give Syria an “opportunity for a fresh start.” The GL “will facilitate activity across all sectors of the Syrian economy” and is intended to help rebuild Syria’s economy, financial sector and infrastructure, in line with US foreign policy interests. Treasury also encouraged renewed US investment in Syria.

Specifically, GL 25 authorizes all transactions otherwise prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 542, other than transactions involving blocked persons listed on the SDN list and those blocked via OFAC’s 50% Rule (which applies OFAC sanctions to entities that are owned 50% or more in the aggregate by any one or more OFAC-sanctioned persons or entities). GL 25 further authorizes transactions with the current leadership of Syria under President Ahmed al-Sharaa and permits transactions with the SDNs listed in the Annex, which include the Central Bank of Syria, the Commercial Bank of Syria, and a number of persons in the Syrian energy and oil industry.

According to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) published by OFAC on May 28, 2025, authorized transactions include (but are not limited to) “telecommunications-related services; power grid infrastructure rehabilitation and other energy related services; health care-related services; education-related services; agricultural-related services; civil-aviation and other transportation services; construction-related services; water and waste management-related services; and financial and investment services.” Furthermore, US banks can process transactions for any activities otherwise authorized by the GL, and US persons and “members of the Syrian diaspora community” are authorized to provide “support” to the new Government of Syria.

Authorized transactions also include “[t]he provision of services to people and companies in Syria; New investment in Syria; The import of or dealing in petroleum and petroleum products from Syria; Transactions with the new Government of Syria; [and] Transactions involving certain blocked persons, which are listed in the Annex to GL 25.”

The FAQs also highlight that GL 25 does not remove any existing authorizations for humanitarian aid and may overlap with such authorizations in existing general licenses under other authorities, such as the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations. With respect to authorizations related to certain nongovernmental organizations’ activities, the FAQs highlight that “U.S. depository institutions, U.S. registered brokers or dealers in securities, and U.S. registered money transmitters can process such transactions and may rely on the statements of their customers that such transactions are authorized unless they know or have reason to know a transaction is not authorized.”

Key OFAC restrictions remain in place, however. Importantly, the GL does not authorize transactions and dealings with Syria-related parties on the SDN list and blocked via the OFAC 50% rule. GL 25 also does not authorize the unblocking of any property or interests in property that were blocked as of May 22, 2025. For example, the OFAC FAQs indicate that, with respect to the Central Bank of Syria, although US financial institutions are authorized to process “transactions by, to and through the Central Bank of Syria,” the license “does not unblock any property of the Central Bank of Syria.” Also not authorized are transactions involving any individual or entity on the SDN list, such as “Bashar al-Assad, his enablers, and Captagon traffickers Taher al-Kayali and Khaldoun Hamieh.” GL 25 also does not authorize any transactions for or on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of Iran or the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or related to the transfer or provision of goods, technology, software, funds, financing or services to or from Iran, Russia or the DPRK.

FinCEN: Correspondent banking relationships permitted with Commercial Bank of Syria

FinCEN similarly eased restrictions and provided exceptive relief under 31 U.S.C. 5318(a)(7) and 31 C.F.R. 1010.970 to the Commercial Bank of Syria. This exceptive relief permits covered financial institutions to open and maintain correspondent accounts for the Commercial Bank of Syria. However, this relief does not apply to a correspondent account that is established, maintained, administered or managed in the United States by a covered financial institution (as defined in 31 C.F.R. 1010.653(a)(3)) for, or on behalf of, the Commercial Bank of Syria. 

State Department: Waivers issued for certain secondary sanctions

Pursuant to Section 7432(b)(1) of the Caesar Act (22 U.S.C. 8791 note), the State Department may waive the application of secondary sanctions on foreign persons imposed pursuant to the Caesar Act for renewable periods not to exceed 180 days. The State Department issued this waiver on May 23, 2025, waiving for 180 days the application of sanctions under Section 7412 of the Caesar Act (22 U.S.C. 8791 note) regarding foreign persons who engage in transactions with: 

•  the Government of Syria, 
• another foreign person operating in a military capacity inside Syria for or on behalf of the Government of Syria, Russia or Iran, or 
• another foreign person subject to IEEPA or other laws with respect to Syria.

In 2011, the European Union adopted its own autonomous sanctions in response to the Syrian government’s violent crackdown on civilians. These measures have since evolved into a broad and multifaceted regime under Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 36/2012. Over time, the European Union has expanded its listings to include senior military and intelligence officials, regime-affiliated militias, chemical weapons experts, and individuals and entities providing financial or logistical support to the Syrian regime. Additional measures were introduced in 2013 and 2014 in response to the unlawful removal of Syrian cultural property.