On November 12, 2025, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) entered into its first deferred prosecution agreement (DPA)¹ for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) since the beginning of the Trump Administration. This resolution follows the issuance of the Guidelines for Investigations and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) (June Guidelines),² which were issued after the DOJ “paused” FCPA enforcement pursuant to an executive order issued earlier in the year. The June Guidelines provide a non-exhaustive list of factors prosecutors should consider when determining whether to pursue FCPA investigations and enforcement actions.³ The resolution features one of the “primary consideration[s]” outlined in the June Guidelines: whether the alleged conduct “utilizes money launderers or shell companies that engage in money laundering for Cartels or TCOs [transnational criminal organizations].”  The matter also provides further evidence of the DOJ’s focus on conduct in Latin America, underscoring risks for companies that conduct business there.

Factual Basis for the Deferred Prosecution Agreement

Comunicaciones Celulares S.A., d/b/a TIGO Guatemala, a Guatemala-based mobile and fixed telecommunications service provider, entered into the DPA with the DOJ after a lengthy investigation spanning multiple administrations.⁵ TIGO Guatemala was charged with conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA in connection with payments made by TIGO Guatemala executives and shareholders to Guatemalan officials to secure improper advantages.⁶

The alleged behavior occurred from 2012 through June 2018 in the Southern District of Florida and elsewhere.⁷ According to the DOJ’s papers, TIGO Guatemala officials made monthly cash payments to Guatemalan members of Congress in exchange for legislation and policies favorable to TIGO Guatemala.⁸ For example, in 2012, these payments helped secure legislation allowing TIGO Guatemala to renew its title to a specific radiofrequency spectrum for a 20-year term.⁹ Additionally, cash used for certain bribes allegedly originated from “narcotrafficking proceeds.”¹⁰ For example, in 2016, a banker laundered cash from a drug trafficker, providing the cash to a TIGO Guatemala executive for bribes.¹¹

During the relevant period, TIGO Guatemala was jointly owned by Millicom International Cellular SA (Millicom), an international telecommunications company holding 55% of the ownership share (though without operational control), and a Panamanian company whose name was not revealed in the criminal information (Panama Company).¹² Millicom purchased Panama Company’s shares and became the sole owner of TIGO Guatemala in November 2021.¹³ According to the DOJ papers, Millicom is headquartered in Luxembourg, but its principal place of business is in the United States (specifically, Florida).¹⁴ In 2015, Millicom voluntarily disclosed misconduct at TIGO Guatemala to the DOJ.¹⁵ The DOJ closed its initial investigation in 2018. However, the DOJ subsequently reopened its investigation in 2020 after it obtained new evidence from sources other than Tigo Guatemala and Millicom (together, the Parties).¹⁶ During the second phase of the investigation, the DOJ obtained new evidence indicating that narcotrafficking proceeds were used to fund bribes and that the criminal conduct occurred during and after the DOJ’s closure of the first phase of the investigation.¹⁷

Although Millicom is publicly traded in the United States, there is no public indication that the Securities and Exchange Commission pursued an FCPA investigation of the conduct.

Overview of the Resolution

Under the DPA, TIGO Guatemala is required to pay a monetary penalty of $60 million and to forfeit $58.2 million in approximate benefits derived from the improper payments.¹⁸ The Parties have committed to enhancing TIGO Guatemala’s compliance program and internal controls to meet the requirements included in the DPA.¹⁹ Additionally, the Parties have committed to submitting a report to the DOJ within one year of the DPA, updating the DOJ on remediation efforts and testing related to the effectiveness of their compliance program and including proposals to ensure the effectiveness of that program.²⁰ Notably, the fine amount represents a 50% reduction from the bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines range, and the term of the agreement is two years, which is shorter than the typical three-year term that has historically been included in DPAs involving the DOJ’s FCPA Unit.²¹

The DPA notes several mitigating factors that resulted in these more favorable terms.²² The DOJ credited the Parties for cooperating with the DOJ’s investigation, their remediation efforts and committing to enhancing their compliance program.²³ In particular, the DOJ pointed to the Parties’ remediation, enhancements to the compliance program and commitment to periodic reporting on the compliance program as influencing the decision not to impose an independent compliance monitor and limit the term of the DPA to two years.²⁴ The DOJ also gave “significant weight” to Millicom’s self-reporting of certain conduct in 2015, affording TIGO Guatemala the “maximum reduction for cooperation and remediation” under Part III of the DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP). However, because not all the relevant conduct was related to this initial self-disclosure, TIGO Guatemala was not able to qualify for voluntary disclosure credit.²⁵ The DOJ listed several remedial measures that factored into its decision to afford credit to TIGO Guatemala under the CEP, including Millicom’s adoption of an “ephemeral messaging policy” and engagement in “significantly restructuring, expanding, and resourcing Millicom’s global compliance program, including enhancing its compliance risk assessment process, growing the dedicated compliance headcount by 800%, and engaging in continuous monitoring, testing, and updating of Millicom’s global compliance program.”²⁶

Key Takeaways from the Agreement

This resolution is notable in a number of respects:

• As the first DPA since the pause in FCPA enforcement, it provides further evidence that the DOJ may scrutinize conduct in Latin America more closely and that it may not be limiting its attention to companies that compete with or harm US companies. 
• In the current enforcement climate, companies should assess their business risks and controls in their Latin American business units, focusing particularly on information about any potential touchpoints to third parties that themselves may have touchpoints to activity that might trigger DOJ focus on those entities, such as potential connections to cartels, TCOs or narcotrafficking.
• While the DOJ closed numerous FCPA investigations as part of its “review” earlier this year, this case is another example indicating that not all FCPA investigations were closed and that the current administration does intend to continue pursuing FCPA matters. Indeed, the conduct described in the DOJ’s papers is very much like the conduct the DOJ pursued for decades (although, as noted earlier, the connections to Latin America and alleged narcotics trafficking may have made the matter a higher priority for the DOJ).
• This case is an important reminder of the risks of entering into joint venture arrangements, particularly in industries and geographies where there are corruption risks. Companies should both conduct appropriate diligence on potential partners and implement contractual provisions allowing for control or influence over operations, including, where appropriate, the ability to gather and disclose evidence of misconduct.
• While the DOJ has continued to emphasize its willingness to provide voluntary disclosure credit to those companies that self-disclose potential misconduct, it nonetheless appears to be strictly construing its requirements on this topic; therefore, receiving credit for a voluntary disclosure will require full disclosure of all relevant conduct.
• The DOJ will likely continue to look to provide more favorable terms to companies that implement remediation, have a robust compliance program and agree to report to the DOJ regarding the state of their compliance program. In this case, the company received substantial cooperation and remediation credit, avoided a compliance monitor, and was subject to only a two-year, not a three-year, term for completion of the DPA.
• The DOJ credited the Parties for, among other things, adopting an ephemeral messaging policy. This indicates that the DOJ continues to focus on this aspect of corporate document retention, which many companies have found challenging. Companies should continue to find practical ways to address this issue in their corporate compliance programs.