Assignment and Enforcement of ICSID Awards

Assignment and Enforcement of ICSID Awards

Blog International Arbitration Legal Developments

1. In a recent judgment, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that rights arising under an ICSID award against Spain could not be assigned by the award creditor to a third party. As a result, an assignee could not replace the original award creditor in English enforcement proceedings.  This update summarizes the background to the OperaFund case and discusses the key findings and implications of the Court of Appeal’s decision, which diverges from more pragmatic approaches recently applied in other jurisdictions. 

I. BACKGROUND

2. In 2019, OperaFund Eco-Invest Sicav plc and Schwab Holding AG (“Investors”) won an ICSID arbitration against Spain under the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”), in one of numerous claims brought against Spain following its revocation of a solar energy framework designed to attract foreign investment. The tribunal held that Spain had breached the ECT and ordered Spain to pay the Investors approximately €30 million. 

3. The Investors registered the ICSID award in the United Kingdom in 2021. Spain challenged the registration of the award based on, among other objections, state immunity, but the High Court provisionally upheld the registration pending the resolution of separate proceedings before the Court of Appeal involving Spain.

4. In 2024, the Investors assigned the award to a fund named Blasket Renewable Investments LLC (“Blasket”). Blasket then applied to be substituted for the Investors in the ongoing enforcement proceedings against Spain before the English courts.  Under Civil Procedure Rule 19.4.2(a), a new party can be substituted for the existing party if “the existing party’s interest or liability has passed to the new party.”  Spain objected to the introduction of Blasket, arguing that under international law an ICSID award may not be assigned.  As a result, Spain argued that no “interest or liability” could have passed to Blasket. 

5. The application to introduce Blasket into the English proceedings was decided in the High Court on 10 November 2025.1 As we reported, the High Court held that the ICSID award could not be assigned to Blasket.  Blasket appealed to the Court of Appeal.  

6. On 2 November 2026, the Court of Appeal dismissed Blasket’s appeal.2 Foxton LJ’s leading judgment held that:

a. An ICSID award may not be assigned because customary international law does not permit the beneficiary of a right arising under a treaty to assign that right without the consent of the obligor State. There is also no rule of customary international law that would provide an exception to the prohibition on assignment for investors under international investment treaties.3

b. The Investors’ prior registration of the ICSID award in the English courts did not create a separate right of enforcement under domestic law that could be assigned to Blasket. The right of enforcement under Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention only belongs to a party to the dispute, not an assignee.  Blasket was therefore not entitled to enforce the assigned ICSID award in the English courts.4

7.  The judgment considered five issues for determination, numbered Grounds 1A to 1D and Ground 2. This post will first consider Grounds 1A and 2.  The post will then consider additional points of interest arising from Grounds 1B, 1C and 1D, which were not strictly necessary to decide once Ground 1A had failed. 

II. GROUND 1A: ASSIGNMENT OF ICSID AWARDS IS NOT PERMITTED BY THE ICSID CONVENTION, THE ECT OR CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

8. Ground 1A asked simply whether an ICSID award creditor could assign the benefit of its award. The Court of Appeal noted that neither the ICSID Convention nor the ECT expressly authorized or prohibited the assignment of an ICSID award.  It therefore turned to customary international law to inform its interpretation of both treaties.5

9. No assignment under customary international law. After surveying international state practice and opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that there was no rule of customary international law that allowed the beneficiary of a treaty right to assign that right without the consent of the obligor State.6  The Court of Appeal also noted the potential risk in recognizing a general right to assign treaty rights unilaterally: while a treaty such as the ECT grants rights directly to a private investor, those rights are subject to strict qualifying requirements such as nationality.  On that logic, an entity that was neither a qualifying investor, nor held a qualifying investment, under the ECT would be seeking to enforce rights against a host State that the Contracting Parties never agreed to grant.7

10. Treaty rights are inseparable from their underlying award. Blasket argued that it had acquired rights akin to a debt, which it was entitled to enforce without claiming the substantive rights that the Investors enjoyed under the ECT.  However, the Court of Appeal held that this reasoning could not apply to an ICSID award: the binding force of an ICSID award, and the Contracting Parties’ obligation to recognize and enforce an award, arise under Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention.  They are international law rights pertaining to a qualified investor with a qualifying investment and cannot simply be transferred as a debt.8

11. The Lotus principle cannot apply where it changes an obligor State’s obligations. Blasket also argued that, applying the Lotus principle under international law, assignment was permitted because it was not expressly prohibited.  The Court of Appeal rejected this argument.  The Lotus principle gives a State the freedom to act as long as it does not breach an express prohibition owed to another State.  However, a unilateral act such as an assignment that affects the international obligations of an obligor State – in this case, Spain – is not legally effective.  In addition, while the Lotus principle could in theory apply to non-state actors such as an investor, this was “clearly a debatable proposition.”9

12. Conclusions on assignability appear confined to ICSID Convention awards. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that courts in other jurisdictions, notably the United States, Australia and the Netherlands (in an interim decision), had accepted that an investment treaty award against a host State was assignable and enforceable in their national courts.  However, the Court of Appeal considered those decisions to be distinguishable.  Some concerned non-ICSID awards under the New York Convention, which is widely understood to permit enforcement by an assignee where the assignment is valid under the applicable law.  Other decisions focused on whether the treaties, or domestic law, prohibited assignment, rather than the anterior question of whether international law permitted the transfer of treaty rights without the debtor State’s consent.10

III. GROUND 2: NO INDEPENDENT, ASSIGNABLE RIGHT TO ENFORCEMENT UNDER DOMESTIC LAW

13. A Contracting State’s obligation to recognize and enforce ICSID awards is contained in Chapter IV, Section 6 of the ICSID Convention. Article 53(1) sets out that an award “shall be binding on the parties”; Article 54(2) then sets out that “a party” may seek the registration of an award in the territory of a Contracting State.  Finally, Article 54(3) states that execution of an award is governed by the laws of the State where execution is sought. 

14. Ground 2 asked whether the right to enforce an ICSID award could be assigned as a matter of English law.

15. Blasket argued that Articles 53 and 54 left matters of enforcement and assignment to be determined by domestic courts under their national law. Blasket then pointed to Section 2 of the Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1966, which implements the ICSID Convention in the UK and allows for the process of registration and enforcement of an ICSID award.  Blasket argued that Section 2 gave the Investors a standalone right under domestic law arising out of the award, and that this right could be assigned. 

16. The Court of Appeal held that international law governed the question of whether assignment was possible; this in turn determined the substantive question of who was entitled to payment. Only then could procedural considerations of enforcement and execution under domestic law arise.11 The Court of Appeal therefore held that Section 2(1) did not create substantive rights beyond those rights contained in the ICSID Convention; rather, it provided the machinery to enforce an ICSID award domestically.  Section 2(1) offered the award creditor a remedy, but that remedy could not be separated from the award creditor’s underlying rights.12

17. The Court of Appeal noted that a further undesirable consequence of Blasket’s proposed interpretation would be that an award would be assignable in some jurisdictions, but not in others. In addition, registration of an award may create a right of assignment in some jurisdictions but not others, leading to further inconsistency.  In this respect, the Court of Appeal agreed with Judge Pelling KC that this would create an “entirely random outcome.”13

IV. GROUNDS 1B – 1D: RULINGS ON NON-DETERMINATIVE GROUNDS

18. The Court of Appeal also considered the following grounds of appeal, which were not strictly necessary once it had decided Ground 1A.

19. Ground 1B asked whether Article 15 (Subrogation) of the ECT precluded assignment of an award under the ECT. Article 15 provides that where a State indemnifies an investor in respect of an investment in a host State, it will automatically acquire the investor’s claims against the host State.  The host State must recognize this assignment and the right of the assignee to enforce its acquired rights. 

20. Spain argued that the requirement for a host State to recognize the assignment or subrogation in Article 15 would be unnecessary if assignment was already permitted under the ECT.  On this logic, assignment must therefore be prohibited – a position that Judge Pelling KC accepted in the High Court.14  The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that Article 15 does not preclude assignment.  If customary international law did recognize a general right of assignment, then the lack of a specific prohibition on assignment in the ECT would make it very unlikely that Article 15 was intended to exclude assignment.  Rather, Article 15 serves a broader purpose, including allowing the home State of an investor to bring a claim against a host State on its behalf under the ECT.  Article 15 does not, therefore, prohibit assignment.15

21. Ground 1C asked whether Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention allows anyone apart the original award creditor to seek recognition and enforcement of an ICSID award. Blasket argued that it could, because Article 54(2) gave that right to “a party” without qualification.  The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that reference to a “party” in Article 54(2) “is most obviously read” as a party to the dispute on whom an award is binding under Article 53(1).16 The Court of Appeal acknowledged that, despite having similar wording, the New York Convention is generally accepted as permitting the enforcement of an award by an assignee.  However, the ICSID Convention is “very different in its scope, structure and conception.”17

22. The Court of Appeal also noted that Spain had conceded that, as a matter of international law, it could have consented to the assignment of a treaty right to a third party. This then raised the question of whether a consensual assignee of an ICSID award could rely on the enforcement provisions in Article 54(2).  The Court of Appeal declined to decide this issue, although it observed that it raised potential problems: even if the award debtor consented to the assignment, it would nonetheless impact the treaty obligations under Article 54 of the other Contracting Parties who may be asked to enforce the award.18

23. Ground 1D then asked whether the original award creditor could initiate the recognition and enforcement process in a national court under Article 54(2) and then allow the assignee to pursue that process. The Court of Appeal held this was a “hopeless” argument: when a party “seeks” recognition and enforcement, that is an ongoing process until recognition and enforcement are achieved.  If the assignee took over that process before it was complete, it would plainly still be seeking recognition and enforcement of the award, a right that is reserved to the award creditor.19 An assignor cannot, therefore, simply begin the process and then hand it over to the assignee.

24. The Court of Appeal also noted the likely practical difficulties with this approach: the Investors would have initiated the recognition process in the UK, then assigned the award to Blasket and allowed Blasket to pursue recognition. However, if Article 54(2) required the Investors to initiate recognition and enforcement proceedings, then the Investors would still need to do so on Blasket’s behalf in other jurisdictions, despite no longer owning the award.20

V. CONCLUSION

25. Enforcement of ICSID awards in the UK remains complicated where assignment is involved. The Court of Appeal’s decision in OperaFund maintains the difficulties faced by ICSID award creditors and assignees of ICSID awards in the United Kingdom following the High Court’s 2025 judgment.  ICSID award creditors cannot cleanly transfer their interest to an assignee, and assignees must rely on the continued cooperation of the award creditor, who alone can register and enforce the award.  

26. Parties should reconsider their arrangements when seeking to sell or monetize an ICSID award. As we advised following the High Court decision, parties wishing to buy or sell ICSID awards may need to reconsider their strategy.  Parties may be able to transfer their interest in substance through private contractual arrangements or funding agreements, but only the award creditor itself may formally seek registration and enforcement of the award in court.  It is also clear that the award creditor must follow that process until the end: it cannot, as the Investors tried to do, initiate the process and then let the assignee conduct it.   

27. An investor that has been subject to unlawful host State measures causing significant (or total) losses to their investment will generally spend years seeking redress in costly proceedings before an international tribunal. In order to pursue the claim, they may have needed to enter into claim-funding arrangements that divert a portion of their eventual claim proceeds.  By adding further cost and delay, the Court of Appeal’s decision fails to take account of the practical realities of ICSID award creditors.

28. English courts reject concerns about unfairness and impracticality. Before both courts, Blasket argued that restricting the assignment of ICSID awards would be commercially impractical and unfair.  It contended that prohibiting assignment would undermine the ECT’s purpose of promoting and protecting investment: States leave many investment treaty awards unpaid, and assignment can help successful, potentially impecunious investors to monetize their awards.

29. In the High Court, Judge Pelling KC had dismissed this argument, emphasizing that (1) the Investors remained entitled to enforce the award against Spain; and (2) Blasket remained entitled to control the legal process and recover any sums recovered by the Investors, as per the terms of its assignment agreement.21 The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that there was no evidence that the ability to assign an award added a fundamental layer of protection for investors, especially in light of other legal mechanisms available to the parties (such as a trust over the award).22

30. Both Males LJ and Lewison LJ agreed with Foxton LJ’s judgment but appeared to acknowledge that the decision was unsatisfactory for investors. Males LJ noted that, while this was not the current state of international law, “it may be desirable as a matter of international law that an ICSID Convention award against a contracting state such as Spain should be assignable.”23  Lewison LJ added that “this litigation arises out of Spain’s regrettable failure to abide by its treaty obligation to comply with an ICSID award.”24

31. Inconsistent approaches between jurisdictions. The Court of Appeal’s decision in OperaFund also entrenches a diverging approach between the United States, the Netherlands and Australia, whose courts have permitted the registration and enforcement of assigned ICSID awards, and the United Kingdom.  Given that the ICSID framework has traditionally been appealing to commercial parties due to its consistency and predictability, this is arguably an unwelcome development and a missed opportunity.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that it was undesirable to have divergent decisions on the meaning and effect of the same treaty.  However, it viewed this outcome as unavoidable because a national court is tasked with ascertaining the correct – and not most consistent – interpretation of the treaty.25

32. This fragmented approach can immediately be seen in practice with this case, where Blasket is also seeking to enforce the OperaFund award in the U.S. courts. Shortly before the Court of Appeal’s decision was handed down, a U.S. court firmly rejected Spain’s motion to dismiss Blasket’s enforcement action, ruling that the ICSID Convention does not prohibit assignment.  Referring to Spain’s argument that only the parties to the dispute could enforce the award under the ICSID Convention, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that “suggesting that the [Convention] barred assignability in this obtuse and imprecise manner strains credulity.”26

33. Blasket has sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeal judgment, which is highly consequential to ICSID award creditors, funders and investors, to the Supreme Court.  A key issue to monitor will be whether the Supreme Court upholds the Court of Appeal’s treatment of an ICSID award and its underlying pecuniary obligations as one indivisible whole, rather than two conceptually distinct is

 


 

1. OperaFund Eco-Invest Sicav Plc & another v. Kingdom of Spain [2025] EWHC 2874 (Comm) (“OperaFund (High Court)”).

2. Operafund Eco-Invest Sicav Plc & others v. Kingdom of Spain [2026] EWCA Civ 1392 (“OperaFund (Court of Appeal)”). 

3. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 59-61, 75-99. 

4. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 152-159.

5. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at para. 51.  

6. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 59, 75-78.

7. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 60, 75.

8. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 92-98.

9. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 80-91. 

10. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 63-77, 137.

11. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 144-153.  

12. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 143(i)-(iii), 151-159. 

13. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 156-159, citing OperaFund (High Court), at para. 78.  

14. OperaFund (High Court), at paras. 52-54.

15. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 108-112.

16. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at para. 133.

17. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at para. 137(iv). 

18. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at para. 137(iii).  See also paras. 165-166 (leaving open the issue of whether a transferee of rights following death, insolvency or corporate succession could obtain recognition and enforcement under Article 54(2)).  

19. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at para. 138. 

20. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at para. 139.  The Court of Appeal did not need to decide this point. 

21. OperaFund (High Court), at para. 49, cited at OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at para. 116.

22. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at paras. 114-117. 

23. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at para. 163. 

24. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at para. 167.   

25. OperaFund (Court of Appeal), at para. 137(i).

26. OperaFund Eco-Invest SICAV PLC and Schwab Holding AG v. Kingdom of Spain, Memorandum Opinion & Order, No. 25 Civ. 1756 (RDM) (D.D.C., 30 September 2026), at p. 12.   

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