Precedential and Key Federal Circuit Opinions
1. GOOGLE LLC v. DDC TECHNOLOGY, LLC [OPINION] (2025-1315, 2025-1316, 2025-1330, 11/05/2026) (Reyna, Hughes, Stark)
Reyna, J. The Court affirmed three final written decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) determining that Petitioner failed to prove the obviousness of certain claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,420,075, 10,528,199, and 11,093,001. The challenged patents are directed to a virtual reality viewer configured for use with conventionally available smartphones, comprising a housing for receiving a smartphone and an input mechanism that a user can manipulate from outside the housing. The Court held that there was no error in the Board’s determination that objective indicia of nonobviousness outweighed Petitioner’s prima facie case of obviousness and rejected Petitioners’ other claim-construction and prior-art-based arguments.
For claims 1 of the ’075 and ’199 patents, the Board determined that the combination of the Kondo and Chu references taught each limitation and that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine them with a reasonable expectation of success, but found that Patent Owner’s objective indicia weighed in favor of nonobviousness. In particular, the Board found that Patent Owner established copying by Petitioner, which the Board weighed “heavily” in favor of nonobviousness, and industry praise, which the Board gave “moderate weight.” Op. at 6. The Court affirmed. On copying, the Court agreed with Petitioner that “the correct comparison is not between the devices at issue and the challenged claims but between the alleged patented devices and the alleged copied product,” Op. at 12, but held that the Board made that comparison. On industry praise, the evidence consisted of emails from three of Petitioner’s engineers responding to an email from the inventor, a prospective business partner, about a prototype viewer (e.g., “That button is genius.”). Op. at 13. The Court distinguished cases discounting “self-serving statements,” because Petitioner’s engineers were responding to a third party about a prototype viewer that was not Petitioner’s (not complimenting their own work), and the Board had considered and accounted for any lack of impartiality in the emails due to “interpersonal and business reasons for responding positively.” Op. at 14.
The Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that its “strong prima facie case easily outweighs” Patent Owner’s secondary-considerations evidence. Op. at 15. The Court explained that “evidence of secondary considerations ‘must always when present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness,’” and “the argument that ‘objective considerations of non-obviousness can never overcome a strong prima facie case of obviousness’ is contrary to law.” Op. at 15–16 (quoting Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983); WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Although “[a] strong case of prima facie obviousness . . . cannot be overcome by a far weaker showing of objective indicia of nonobviousness,” that was not the case here. Op. at 18 (quoting Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). The Board made no finding that Petitioner’s evidence was “strong” or “overwhelming,” but did find that there was “strong” evidence of copying and gave “moderate” weight to industry praise. Op. at 16, 18–19. On this record, the Court could not “say as a matter of law that [Petitioner’s] evidence of obviousness is strong enough to outweigh [Patent Owner’s] evidence of nonobviousness.” Op. at 19.
The Court also affirmed as to the remaining surviving , rejecting Petitioner’s claim construction arguments.
2. IN RE NETLIST, INC. [OPINION] (2025-1286, 2025-1296, 11/13/2026) (Dyk, Linn, Chen)
Dyk, J. The Court affirmed two decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) determining all claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 11,093,417 and 9,858,215—directed to improvements to computer memory architecture—to be unpatentable as obvious over U.S. Patent No. 7,363,422 (“Perego”) in view of an industry standard specification (“JESD79-2”) published by the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (“JEDEC”). Patent Owner did not dispute that the combination discloses the challenged patent’s claim limitations, but argued that a skilled artisan would have lacked motivation to combine because the combination would be inoperable for Perego’s intended purpose of improving Rambus architecture and would not have served Perego’s related purpose to have backward compatibility.
The Court found that Patent Owner “misconceive[d] the law of obviousness.” Op. at 8. The Court explained that the relevant question for “the motivation-to-combine portion of the inquiry is whether a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention,” and the Court has “often confirmed that in a motivation-to-combine analysis, ‘the intended purpose of [the prior art] does not control.’” Op. at 9 (quoting Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 73 F.4th 950, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2023); Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021)). Here, the Court determined that “compatibility with Rambus was not the purpose of the claimed invention, and backward compatibility was not an objective of the claimed invention.” Op. at 9. Instead, the Court explained that “the claimed invention is directed to the ability to function in a JEDEC-compliant architecture.” Op. at 9. The Court recognized that the purpose of the prior art may be pertinent in limited circumstances, such as where the prior-art reference itself supplies the asserted motivation to combine, or where the prior art shares a purpose with the challenged claims. Op. at 10–11. The Court determined that neither circumstance applied here, because Petitioners did not rely on Perego’s Rambus capabilities to establish motivation to combine, and neither Rambus compatibility nor backward compatibility with Rambus architecture was a shared purpose of the invention. The Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the combination of Perego with JESD79-2 was operable for the purpose of the challenged claims and a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to make that combination.
3. TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. CELLCO PARTNERSHIP [OPINION] (2025-1496, 2025-1683, 11/16/2026) (Dyk, Chen, Stoll)
Dyk, J. The Court vacated a judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas for lack of jurisdiction in a case where the Western District of Texas had entered judgment denying Plaintiff’s independent action seeking to void a judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas that awarded attorneys’ fees to Defendant under 35 U.S.C. § 285.
In two previous appeals, the Court had affirmed the Eastern District’s judgment of indefiniteness and noninfringement, Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 15 F.4th 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2021), and the Eastern District’s subsequent award of fees to Defendant under § 285, Traxcell Techs., LLC v. AT&T Inc., No. 23-1246, 2023 WL 4503520 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2023). Plaintiff then filed an independent action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(1) in the Western District seeking to void the fee award because, Plaintiff argued, it violated the Federal Circuit’s mandate from the first appeal. The Western District denied a preliminary injunction, concluding that Plaintiff did not have a reasonable likelihood of prevailing because the fee award “is not void,” and the parties stipulated to final judgment, which Plaintiff appealed. Op. at 3–4.
The Court first held that it had appellate jurisdiction, rejecting Defendant’s argument that the case required only the application of the mandate rule rather than the resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law. The Court found that Plaintiff’s action “is, on its face, an action to set aside a judgment for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, a provision of the Patent Act,” Op. at 4, and is similar to a declaratory judgment action challenging a fee award under § 285, over which the Court would have jurisdiction.
Although the issue was not raised by the parties, the Court concluded that the Western District lacked jurisdiction for two reasons. First, an independent action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 “should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice,” Op. at 6 (quoting United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998)), and “a district court lacks jurisdiction over an independent action if the allegations of the complaint fail to meet the high standard for an independent action.” Op. at 7. The Court explained that “it is proper for a district court to consider attorneys’ fees separately after a final judgment on the merits,” and that the Court “routinely reviews awards of fees under § 285 after it previously ruled on the merits.” Op. at 7. Therefore, the Court held that “[t]he frivolous theory that the Eastern District of Texas lacked jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees does not come close to satisfying the grave-miscarriage-of-justice standard.” Op. at 7. Second, the Court held that “one district court may not entertain an independent action to set aside another district court’s judgment that has been affirmed on appeal, whether or not” a case qualifies as a permissible independent action under the Beggerly standard. Op. at 8. Because Plaintiff’s independent action sought to countermand a judgment already affirmed by the Court, the Western District lacked jurisdiction, as “[a] district court has no jurisdiction over an independent action or Rule 60 cause of action seeking to overturn an order of a court of appeals.” Op. at 9.