This article was first published on May 1, 2026 in the New Law Journal.
The centuries‑old common‑law offence of misconduct in public office (MiPO) has re‑entered the headlines in recent weeks.
In February, Andrew Mountbatten‑Windsor and Peter Mandelson were both arrested on suspicion of MiPO and later released, in the context of investigations relating to the Epstein Files. In early March, Police Federation Chief Executive Mukund Krishna was arrested on suspicion of fraud by abuse of position, while retired Metropolitan Commander, Karen Findlay, was reportedly facing potential charges, including MiPO. Meanwhile, several public inquiries (such as the UK Covid‑19 Inquiry, the Post Office Inquiry and the Infected Blood Inquiry) continue to examine the conduct of public officials – ranging from former prime ministers and cabinet ministers to senior Post Office executives and public health officials.
Against this backdrop, this article considers whether MiPO remains fit for purpose and whether the replacement offences proposed under the Public Office (Accountability) Bill, currently being scrutinised by the House of Commons, adequately address MiPO’s shortcomings.
MiPO: Elements and Enduring Difficulties
MiPO is a common‑law offence. It is committed when a public officer, acting as such, wilfully neglects to perform their duty or wilfully misconducts themself to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder, without reasonable excuse or justification.
The Law Commission has identified three main problems with the current offence (as set out, for instance, in its Full Report on Misconduct in Public Office (Law Com No 397, 2020) and in Misconduct in Public Office: Issues Paper 1 – The Current Law (2016)).
First, its elements are vague: there is no definitive list of “public officers”; there is uncertainty as to when an individual is “acting as such”; and there is no principled method for determining whether the conduct constitutes an abuse of public trust.
Second, this ambiguity has allowed MiPO to expand into an overly broad offence, sometimes used where more targeted statutory offences may have been available. Indeed, the Law Commission found that many cases involving allegations against police officers may have been more appropriately charged as statutory offences; notably, offences under the Official Secrets Act 1989, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 or the Data Protection Act 1998 could have been charged in cases of disclosing highly sensitive or personal information.
Likewise, police misconduct has sometimes been prosecuted under MiPO when offences under the Bribery Act 2010 or improper use of the powers and privileges of a constable under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 would have been available. An example of this is the case of the former Met police officer, Muhammed Darr, who pleaded guilty to three counts of MiPO and was sentenced to 40 months’ imprisonment in 2024 after repeatedly accessing police systems without lawful purpose, passing confidential information to friends and associates, stealing property from members of the public while on duty, and using bank details of deceased persons after attending deaths in an official capacity.
Third, MiPO is rarely used against senior officials. The Institute for Government think-tank notes that of the 191 people convicted of MiPO between 2014 and 2024, 92% were police or prison officers and 98% were junior to mid‑level officials, despite MiPO carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. These percentages have contributed to concern that MiPO has operated in practice as a mechanism for sanctioning low‑level officials, rather than as an effective means of addressing serious misconduct by those exercising strategic power.
By contrast, MiPO charges against politicians are rare, and convictions even rarer. None of the senior officials who breached Covid-19 lockdown regulations, nor any members of Parliament (MPs) involved in the 2009 expenses scandal, were charged with MiPO. MiPO charges against former shadow immigration spokesman, Damian Green, and Home Office civil servant, Christopher Galley, relating to leaked Home Office documents were dropped, and former UK Member of the European Parliament Nikki Sinclaire was acquitted of MiPO charges relating to expense claims (see the Institute for Government’s ‘Explainer’, Misconduct in Public Office: What happens if someone holding public office is alleged to have abused their power?, published on 5 February 2026).
Historically, the offence has also been used to prosecute journalists as secondary parties for encouraging public officials to leak confidential information following Operation Elveden –arguably an unexpected use of the offence. Most journalist prosecutions were ultimately discontinued after the Court of Appeal provided guidance on the seriousness element of MiPO (see R v Sabey [2015] EWCA Crim 539), and all journalists’ convictions obtained after trial were later quashed. However, the current Crown Prosecution Service guidance on Prosecuting Cases Where Public Servants Have Disclosed Confidential Information to Journalists indicates that MiPO may still be used to prosecute journalists as aiders and abettors in serious cases.
The Public Office (Accountability) Bill: Replacing MiPO
The Public Office (Accountability) Bill (the Bill), informally known as the “Hillsborough Law”, aims to abolish MiPO and replace it with two statutory offences based on Law Commission recommendations. The Bill was introduced in September 2025. It has progressed through the Commons to Committee stage and has been formally carried over into the next parliamentary session while contested amendments are considered.
The first offence applies when a public office holder uses their office to obtain a benefit for themself or another person, or to cause another person to suffer a detriment, and they know (or ought to know) that doing so is seriously improper (see Part 3, section 12 of the Bill).
The second offence applies when a public office holder who owes a duty to prevent critical harm intentionally or recklessly causes, or creates a significant risk of causing, such harm and their conduct falls far below what could reasonably be expected of them (see Part 3, section 13).
The Bill also introduces offences of failing to comply with a duty of candour in certain inquiries and investigations and of misleading the public through seriously improper communications (see Part 2, sections 5 and 11). The Bill requires public authorities to promote and maintain high standards of ethical conduct, including selflessness, integrity, objectivity, and honesty, through the adoption of codes of ethical conduct and related guidance (see Part 2, section 9).
Will the Bill Fix MiPO’s Core Defects?
The Bill clarifies who and what is covered by the misconduct offences. It provides (i) an extensive list of specific public office holders – ministers, civil servants, MPs, persons serving in policing and law enforcement, etc. – alongside (ii) a test for determining who else may qualify as a public office holder, i.e. those working in certain bodies or offices and exercising functions of a public nature (see Schedule 4).
The Bill provides guidance for determining whether a function is of a public nature, such as considering whether the public has a significant interest in its exercise (Schedule 4). The Bill also sets out non‑exhaustive factors relevant to assessing whether conduct is “seriously improper”, such as dishonesty or intent to mislead, for the purposes of the first offence (Part 3, section 12(3)).
The Bill requires that the Director of Public Prosecutions give their consent to bring proceedings for the proposed offences. Together with tighter elements, this requirement should ensure that the proposed offences are used to prosecute the most serious misconduct, while less serious conduct is dealt with through disciplinary or alternative criminal routes. The proposed offences carry maximum sentences of 10 years’ and 14 years’ imprisonment respectively, far below MiPO’s life sentence maximum, making them more proportionate to the targeted conduct.
Do We Need Public Office‑Specific Offences at All?
Some may question whether bespoke public office offences are necessary. Many forms of misconduct –fraud, bribery, perverting the course of justice, and data protection breaches – are already criminalised regardless of the offender’s public or private status. If the underlying conduct is criminal irrespective of office, one might ask why separate offences are required at all.
There is a case for legislative restraint. Criminal law is the state’s most coercive tool, and unnecessary proliferation or duplication of offences can lead to over‑criminalisation. Creating overlapping offences risks inconsistent charging, uncertainty and disproportionate criminal liability.
However, the Law Commission concluded that targeted public office offences remain necessary to address the gaps that would be left if MiPO were abolished without replacement: serious non‑corrupt neglect of duty causing harm; abuses of position not captured by bribery or fraud offences; and conduct undermining public trust, such as failures of candour, which are not covered by sector‑specific legislation (see chapter 3 of the Law Commission’s Full Report on Misconduct in Public Office (Law Com No 397, 2020)).
Criminal law also has an expressive function: it not only punishes wrongdoing but also expresses societal condemnation and communicates societal norms. Misconduct offences communicate the expectation that those entrusted with public functions are subject to enhanced standards of accountability. By creating a duty of candour and defining ethical standards, the Bill reflects public expectations of honesty, transparency and accountability in the exercise of state power and may, with time, strengthen public trust.
Finally, misconduct by public office holders arguably causes a distinct form of harm, extending to the integrity of public administration and public confidence in democratic institutions. That distinct form of harm supports the case for targeted public office offences, even where overlapping criminal prohibitions may already exist.
Conclusion
Recent arrests, live investigations and high‑profile public inquiries have thrust MiPO back into public debate. Its vagueness, overbreadth and inconsistent deployment have long undermined confidence in the offence. The Bill offers a more principled approach: replacing MiPO with statutory offences and embedding candour within the legal framework governing public administration. There is hope that the Bill, if ultimately adopted, will ensure that future cases are prosecuted with clarity, proportionality and public confidence.
