Disincentives to Leniency: Expect Fewer Golden Eggs if You Harass the Goose

Disincentives to Leniency: Expect Fewer Golden Eggs if You Harass the Goose

Publication

An article written by Frédéric Louis, originally published in the International Comparative Legal Guide to: Cartels & Leniency 2019.

Excerpt The EU Commission’s anticartel enforcement activities have benefitted tremendously from its decision to adopt the philosophy behind the US DOJ’s highly successful leniency programme and make a clear promise of no fines for the first company to inform on a secret cartel. Since that change, it has come to rely more and more on leniency applications as its prime tool for uncovering cartel activity, to the point where most investigations originate in an immunity application.

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