Precedential and Key Federal Circuit Opinions
1. Insulet Corp. v. EOFlow, Co. Ltd., (25-1807, 5/28/2026) (Dyk, Prost, Reyna)
Dyk, J. The Federal Circuit, over a dissent by Judge Prost, reversed a jury determination of trade secret misappropriation on statute of limitations grounds. Insulet Corp. (“Insulet”) sued EOFlow, Co. Ltd., EOFlow, Inc. and its chief executive Jesse Kim (collectively “EOFlow”) for trade secret misappropriation under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) and for patent infringement. Insulet’s claims stemmed from EOFlow’s hiring of several former Insulet employees to work on EOFlow’s insulin patch pump; these employees had previously worked on Insulet’s insulin patch pump. The claims went to trial, and a jury found that EOFlow misappropriated Insulet’s trade secrets. The patent claims, which had been bifurcated from the trade secret claims, were dismissed without prejudice after the trial.
First, the Federal Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction because its jurisdiction extends to district court appeals arising under patent laws. The Federal Circuit found that it had jurisdiction over the trade secret appeal because even though the patent claims were formally dismissed without prejudice, the dismissal had the effect of a dismissal with prejudice because by the time of the dismissal the statute of limitations for at least one patent claim had passed.
Second, the Federal Circuit held that EOFlow was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the DTSA claim because the statute of limitations had run before Insulet sued. Specifically, the Federal Circuit majority held that “the undisputed evidence shows that Insulet knew or should have known before the critical date the facts it needed to sufficiently plead a trade secret misappropriation claim against EOFlow.” Slip Op. at 10. The Federal Circuit reached this result based on the principle that “if a plaintiff has knowledge that (1) the alleged misappropriator has access to the alleged trade secrets through a former employee of the trade secret owner and (2) there is similarity between the trade secrets and the alleged misappropriator’s competing product, then the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts to state a claim for trade secret misappropriation.” Slip Op. at 13-14. In reaching this outcome, the Federal Circuit declined to rule on whether the DTSA uses an inquiry-notice or a discovery standard for its statute of limitations, explaining that the claim was untimely even under the more demanding standard. It did, however, hold that a single statute of limitations analysis applied to all four asserted trade secrets because they all stemmed from the same course of misappropriation and were utilized for the same purpose. Thus, the four trade secrets were properly treated as a single claim of misappropriation for the purposes of the statute of limitations.
In dissent, Judge Prost wrote that the majority erred by (1) “conflat[ing] its application of the discovery rule with the inquiry-notice standard,” (2) “adopt[ing] a framework not supported by the case law,” (3) “encourag[ing] plaintiffs to race to the courthouse with undeveloped claims based on mere suspicion,” and (4) “improperly substitut[ing] our own fact findings for those of the jury.” Slip Op. at 35-36.
2. AGI SureTrack LLC v. Farmers Edge Inc., (24-1730, -1830, 6/2/2026) (Moore, Mayer, Lourie)
Mayer, J. The Federal Circuit affirmed a summary judgment determination of ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and vacated the district court’s unexplained, sua sponte determination that the case was not exceptional. AGI SureTrack LLC (“AGI”) accused Farmers Edge Inc. (“Farmers Edge”) of infringing patents reciting claims directed “to automated systems and methods for capturing, processing and sharing farming data, and more particularly to systems and methods for capturing farming operation data in real time using passive data collection devices attached to farming equipment while the farming equipment is used to perform the farming operations, and then processing and sharing the farming operation data via an online farming data exchange system or server.” Slip Op. at 2. The district court granted Farmers Edge’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that the asserted claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
AGI appealed the summary judgment determination. Considering the two-step Alice test for subject matter eligibility, the Federal Circuit first found the asserted claims directed to an abstract idea related to “gathering and processing farming data.” Slip Op. at 7. AGI had argued that the claims were “not abstract because they claim a technical solution to a technical problem,” were “narrowly tailored to avoid preemption concerns,” and “solve[d] a longstanding problem in the field of precision agriculture, using a nonconventional system architecture.” AGI Reply Br. at 1. In particular, AGI argued that claims “solve the problem of proprietary messaging formats hindering the interoperability of farming implements.” AGI Reply Br. at 3. The Federal Circuit, however, found that the use of “implement profiles” was itself merely additional data processing and that using one set of data to interpret another set of data “merely add[ed] one abstract concept to another.” Slip Op. at 8. At step two, the Federal Circuit held that the claims lacked an inventive concept and therefore were not patent eligible because they “do not disclose any specific inventive technology.” Slip Op. at 9. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the summary judgment.
3. Ollnova Techs. Ltd. v. ecobee Techs. ULC, (25-1045, -1046, 6/4/2026) (Chen, Cunningham, Stark)
Chen, J. On appeal from an Eastern District of Texas jury verdict, the Federal Circuit vacated infringement and damages judgments and remanded for a new trial because, inter alia,(1) the verdict form improperly combined all the asserted patents in a single infringement question and (2) a jury instruction regarding patent eligibility was erroneous. The asserted patents concerned improvements to wireless communications used in a building automation system (“BAS”), which is “an integrated system of components that automates a process control within a building or facility.” Slip Op. at 3.
First, the Federal Circuit found that “the verdict form improperly combined all Asserted Patents into a single infringement question and permitted the jury to find liability without unanimous agreement that ecobee infringed any particular claim of any patent.” Slip Op. at 14 (citing Optis Cellular Tech., LLC v. Apple Inc., 139 F.4th 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2025)).
Second, the Federal Circuit found that the jury instruction on one asserted patent’s subject-matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 was erroneous. The court had previously determined the patent in question was directed to an abstract idea but asked the jury to resolve the Alice step-two factual questions as to whether the claim limitations were well-understood, routine, and conventional. However, in its jury instructions the court neither provided the jury with the abstract idea nor explained that “the abstract idea itself could not supply the inventive concept under Alice step two.” Slip Op. at 18. Because the instruction asked the jury “to determine whether the claim contained an inventive concept without being instructed on the underlying abstract concept required to frame that analysis under Alice,” the instruction was erroneous. Slip Op. at 19. However, the Federal Circuit found that ecobee was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the patent’s eligibility under § 101 because of the fact issues at step two.
Third, ecobee argued that the district court improperly concluded the two other asserted patents were not directed to an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit affirmed. It first found that the claims of one of the at-issue patents were directed to “a specific technology-based improvement in the operation of a network.” Slip Op. at 27. The Federal Circuit found it significant that the claims “recite a particular technique governing when and how information is transmitted within a network using a wireless automation device” because this level of detail tended to show that the claims did more than “merely describe collecting and communicating data in the abstract.” Slip Op. at 27-28. The Federal Circuit then found that the other patent was not directed to an abstract idea as it “addresse[d] technical challenges arising in BAS networks” and “provide[d] a specific manner in which data is transmitted within a BAS system.” Slip Op. at 31.
4. Carolyn W. Hafeman v. Google LLC, (24-1600, -1601, -1602, -1603, -1604, -1605, 6/5/2026) (Dyk, Hughes, Stoll)
Hughes, J. In a consolidated set of appeals from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”), the Federal Circuit dismissed in part and affirmed in part the Board’s final written decisions (“FWDs”) in related inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings, leaving intact the Board’s conclusion that challenged claims generally pertaining “to the return of lost or stolen computers using a recovery screen that appears during or after boot-up of the computer” were unpatentable. Slip Op. at 2.
In response to litigation against LG Electronics Inc., Google and Microsoft filed IPR petitions against Ms. Hafeman’s asserted patents in July 2022. After Ms. Hafeman opposed institution, LG served her with a Sotera stipulation representing that if the IPRs were instituted, then LG would not pursue “any ground that [Google or Microsoft] raised or reasonably could have raised in the IPRs” in the parallel district court proceeding. Slip Op. at 6. Google and Microsoft relied on the Sotera stipulation to argue against discretionary denial of the IPR petitions. Subsequently the Board instituted review. Ms. Hafeman then requested rehearing of the Board’s institution decisions because of purported violations of the Sotera stipulation on the part of LG in the district court matter. The Board declined, and in January 2024 issued final written decisions finding the challenged patent claims unpatentable over the identified prior art. The Board did not address Ms. Hafeman’s arguments regarding the Sotera stipulation.
On appeal, Ms. Hafeman argued “that the Board acted arbitrarily by issuing its FWDs without addressing her argument that the IPR proceedings should be terminated given the District Court’s finding that LG violated the Sotera stipulation.” Slip Op. at 9. Ms. Hafeman argued she was not challenging the Board’s institution decision in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) but was instead challenging the sufficiency of the Board’s decision. The PTO (then led by Director Kathy Vidal) intervened to argue that the Board made no error in declining to reconsider its institution decision; Director John Squires maintained that position at oral argument. The Federal Circuit disagreed with Ms. Hafeman, holding that her challenge “amount[ed] to a challenge, direct or indirect, to the decision to institute,” which is unreviewable. Slip Op. at 10.
