### INTRODUCTION

- There are a wide variety of B2B configurations, which can include single or multiple buyers and/or sellers in a single industry or across several industries
- Examples include:
  - Auction model sellers put up items for sale and buyers bid on them
  - Exchange model B2B hub collects bids from product suppliers and submits them to buyers
  - Catalog model accumulation of product directories from industry suppliers
- > Many B2B's will be hybrids, and almost all will present antitrust issues
- Antitrust issues are particularized to specifics of B2B structure, operation, and industry or industries involved



#### **GENERAL ANALYSIS**

- > There are three primary areas of antitrust concern:
  - Over-inclusion of competitors
  - Under-inclusion of competitors
  - Unnecessary sharing of price, output and/or cost information
- > Analysis in each area involves four key questions:
  - What cost-saving efficiencies are generated by the B2B?
  - What anti-competitive effects may arise? [usually, higher-thancompetitive prices, and lower-than-competitive output or innovation]
  - Are the features of the B2B structure that produce the potential anticompetitive effect necessary to achieve the efficiencies?
  - If so, do the efficiencies "outweigh" the necessarily associated anticompetitive effects?



#### ABUSE OF BUYING SIDE MARKET POWER [OVER-INCLUSIVENESS]

- > May arise where:
  - B2B sponsored by competing purchasers who coordinate purchases and who together constitute a sufficient share of buyers to exercise buying side market power -- i.e., can push input prices below competitive levels
  - Usually > 35% of all market purchases needed for such power
  - Also, reduced input prices <u>probably</u> need to translate to reduced input quantities, reduced output quantities, and higher output prices for antitrust concern
- Relevant inquiry:
  - What is the probability that purchases may be coordinated (directly or indirectly)?
  - Why is so large a share of purchasers required to capture B2B efficiencies?



### EXCLUDING A COMPETITOR FROM AN ESSENTIAL B2B [UNDER-INCLUSIVENESS]

- May arise where:
  - B2B becomes so efficient and successful that access is required for competitive survival [If in fact this efficient, generally will not be an "overinclusiveness" issue.]
  - Probably a relatively rare phenomenon, because normally there will be other avenues of sale or purchase, or the possibility of establishing another B2B
- Relevant inquiry:
  - What is the rationale for exclusion? How will inclusion detract from efficiency?
  - What is the cost to competition if the excluded party cannot compete?



### <u>COLLUSION FACILITATING INFORMATION EXCHANGE</u>

- > May arise where:
  - Many B2Bs will include a great deal of information about costs,, prices, and output levels. Excessive sharing of previously unavailable information can lead to price or output collusion among competitors.
  - The extent to which this information is shared among B2B participants, beyond pre-B2B dissemination, must be carefully considered.
  - Usually the risk is highest in concentrated industries
- Relevant inquiry:
  - Why must the information be shared more broadly -- i.e., what additional efficiencies are captured?
  - Can such information sharing enhance the likelihood of collusion, or facilitate the enforcement of price or output agreements?



### **CONCLUSIONS**

- > B2Bs are new and vary widely
- > Not much existing law specific to B2Bs
- > This means that detailed legal and factual analysis is required in each case
- > The three areas of antitrust concern described here are primary examples,

useful for spotting issues, but hardly an exhaustive list

 Any significant B2B should receive thorough antitrust review before launching

